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 1. Introduction 
Goods’ prices commonly end in nine.  Or, at least, they do in economies with 
decimal coinage.  Those who remember the UK before decimalisation, when 
the coins consisted of pounds, shillings (£1=20 shillings) and pence (1 shilling 
= 12 pence), will recall prices typically ending in 11 pence.  Those with even 
longer memories, when half-pennies and farthings (quarter pennies)  still 
circulated, report that prices such as “three and eleven pence three farthings” 
or “19 shillings and eleven pence ha’penny” were common.
1  Casual 
empiricism suggests that non-economists view this practice as harming 
consumers, benefiting producers, and probably the result of some vaguely-
specified form of consumer irrationality. 
 
Basu (1997, 2006) summarises some of the main explanations for it.
2 Those 
that explain it within the confines of economic rationality use the idea that 
consumers save calculation time by reinterpreting the last, “less important” 
digits of a price.  One plausible way to do this is to think in round numbers, i.e. 
to interpret a price of, say, $7.56 as $7.00.  As we show below, this always 
gives monopolists the incentive to set the less important digits, henceforward 
the cents, as high as possible without triggering a change in the more 
important ones, henceforward the dollars.  
 
                                                      
1 Such prices, the authors can confirm, used to be the staple of school arithmetic tests, no 
doubt contributing to the unpopularity of that subject. 
2 One he does not mention is the explanation attributed to Steven Landsburgh by Tim Harford 
(The Financial Times, 11th August 2006) in response to the question from a reader: that its 
origin is the need to keep shop staff honest  by requiring them to give customers change and 
hence to put the transaction though the till. This explanation is less convincing where 
payments are increasingly made by credit and debit cards, and is also undermined by the fact 
that the prices of high-priced goods also tend to end in 9.   Basu’s (1997, 2006) own explanation assumes consumers save calculation 
time not by rounding prices down but by presuming that each price ends with 
the same number of cents. This too induces monopolists to set the number of 
cents at 99. Hence the only rational number of cents for consumers to expect 
is 99. Prices ending in 99 can therefore be seen as a rational expectations 
equilibrium. 
 
We suggest both models have weaknesses, and we propose an alternative 
which avoids these although it is in the same spirit. Its central idea is that to 
save calculation time whilst remaining within their budget constraint and 
recognising that monopolists profit-maximise, consumers round prices up not 
down. This also gives monopolists the incentive to set prices ending in 99 but 
nevertheless harms them whilst possibly benefiting consumers.  So, 99-prices 
may be an example of consumers exploiting monopolists rather than the 
reverse. 
 
We first establish the general argument, and then provide some illustrations. 
 
2.  The general argument. 
Assume that in the typical market consumers have the utility function 
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where i x is the quantity of good i. They select  i x to maximise utility subject to 
the budget constraint   
m x p x p x p n An A A ≤ + + + ... 2 2 1 1       [2]   
 
where Ai p  is their interpretation of the price of good i, and m is their available 
resources. 
 
For simplicity, we focus on good 1 and assume that all other prices and m are 
constant. Accordingly we write the market demand curve for  1 x  as 
 
) ( 1 1 1 A p x x =          [ 3 ]  
 
The good is supplied by a monopolist who maximises profit,  1 π , given by   
  
)) ( ( ) ( 1 1 1 1 1 A A p x tc p x p − ⋅ = π       [4]   
 
 where 1 p  is the good’s actual price and  )) ( ( 1 1 A p x tc  is the total cost of 
producing the quantity demanded. 
 
In conventional theory  1 A p =  1 p , and it is straightforward to derive the profit 
maximising price, *
1 p , which here will be a function of m and the parameters of 
the utility and total cost functions, all of which are constant. Hence  *
1 p  is 
constant and  1 A p  equals it. From  *
1 p  one can work out  *
1 x , the utility-
maximising quantity demanded, via equation (3);  * U , the maximum level of the consumer’s utility, from equation (1); and  *
1 π , the monopolist’s maximised 
profits, from equation (4).  
 
In what follows we adopt Basu’s convention of referring to any price, 1 p , as 
) , ( 1 1 C D  where  1 D  is the dollar part of the price and  1 C  its cent part. So, for 
example,  ) 45 , 3 (  represents the price $3.45. Assume now that to save 
calculation time by using round numbers consumers round all prices down, 
i.e. the consumer treats an actual price,  1 p  or  ) , ( 1 1 C D , as  1 A p  or  ) 0 , ( 1 D . So, 
when the monopolist sets a price of  ) , ( 1 1 C D  the consumer interprets it as 
) 0 , ( 1 D  and demands the quantity  )) 0 , (( 1 1 D x . This gives monopolists the 
incentive to raise  1 C  to 99 because the quantity demanded and production 
costs will be unaffected whilst revenue and profit will increase. As we show 
below, this practice and the monopolist’s response to it may benefit the 
consumer. 
 
A weakness of this explanation is its implication that consumers persistently 
violate  their budget constraints. Consumers will, for each item, always be 
paying 99 cents more than they presume when deciding their demand. 
Hence, for each good, the difference between the actual and perceived price 
will be as large as it could be, and always positive. Since the budget 
constraint cannot be persistently violated, either the practice of rounding down 
is not persistent, or it is not pervasive, or the industrial structure is not typically 
monopolistic. But if any of these were true then the model would not explain 
the persistence and pervasiveness of prices ending in 99.  
Basu’s alternative assumes that consumers save calculation time not by 
rounding prices down, but by interpreting any price  ) , ( 1 1 C D  as  ) , ( 1 1 EC D  
where  1 EC  is the number of cents that consumers expect all prices to end in. 
So, rather than emphasising the gains from using round numbers Basu 
emphasises the saving in time from assuming a common ending for prices 
rather than examining the last part of each price. For any value of  1 EC  
monopolists still have the same incentive to set prices ending in 99. It follows 
that the rational value of  1 EC  is 99. Hence, in Basu’s model, consumers will 
expect prices to end in 99, and they will. Since consumers are basing their 
demands on correctly perceived prices they will satisfy their budget constraint 
exactly.  As Basu points out, monopolists lose (or at least cannot gain) from 
this practice since their possible combinations of price and quantity are now 
severely restricted to the set of prices ending in 99 and the quantities 
demanded at those prices. We show below that consumers may gain or lose 
from this practice.  
 
One weakness of Basu’s model is that the advantage to consumers of using 
round numbers is lost. They save time by not looking at the cents part of 
prices (as they also would if they round prices down) but calculate using 
prices ending in 99. A second weakness is that not all prices do end in 99. As 
Basu himself remarks, there is no reason why the prices of goods supplied in 
a perfectly competitive market should end in 99. So it is not obvious that the 
rational value of  1 EC  is 99. If it is not then it must be lower and the 
consumers’ budget constraints may then be violated. To overcome this weakness one might assume that consumers apply different methods of 
interpreting prices to different market structures, but this is rather contrived 
and combines awkwardly with the presumed motive of the practice – to save 
calculation time. 
 
Our alternative model is a variant of the round-down model. We assume that 
consumers use round numbers both to ease their calculations and to save 
time in Basu’s sense, but we assume that consumers round prices up rather 
than down, i.e. consumers interpret a price  ) , ( 1 1 C D  as  ) 0 , 1 ( 1 + D  and demand 
)) 0 , 1 (( 1 1 + D x . Monopolist still have the incentive to set  1 C  to 99 since, for a 
given value of  1 D , the value of  1 C  has no effect on the quantity demanded 
and hence on costs but a higher value will always raise revenue. So it will 
always be profit maximising to set  1 C  to 99.  Consumers who round prices up 
obtain all the advantages of rounding; furthermore they will find themselves 
miscalculating prices by only one unit of the lowest denomination of coinage - 
the price will always be the smallest possible amount below their 
interpretation of it; hence, they will always be slightly within their budget 
constraint. The practice is also quite consistent with some prices not ending in 
99. So the practice is potentially persistent and pervasive, and, as we 
illustrate below, it may benefit consumers whilst always harming monopolists.  
 3.   An Illustration 
We illustrate some of these points with the following example. The typical 
consumer  has the CES utility function, 
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which, given the presumed budget constraint,   
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The total cost of producing the quantity 1 x  is  1 tc  where   
 
2
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and  1 γ and  2 γ  are positive constants. Table 1 Illustrations and Comparisons 
 
    
Both cases assume: 
0 1 = γ ;  1 2 = γ ;  1 2 2 = = p pA ; ; 3 . 0 = α 7 . 0 = β ;  ( ) 2 1
*
1 2 / p x p m x − =  
        
  *
1 p   1 A p   *
1 π   * U  
#1.  3 = m ; 1 . 0 = θ         
Conventional 4.40  4.40  0.7171  1.1099 
Round-down 2.99  2.00  1.0316  1.1765 
Basu 3.99  3.99  0.7164  1.1373 
Round-up 4.99  5.00  0.7146  1.0759 
        
        
#2.  705 . 8 = m ; 4 . 0 = θ         
Conventional 2.38  2.38  0.8532  4.3248 
Round-down 2.99  2.00  1.3961  4.1289 
Basu 2.99  2.99  0.8209  4.2152 
Round-up 1.99  2.00  0.8171  4.4240 




The table illustrates some key points. The column headed  *
1 p   shows that 
each method can cause price to rise or fall . The  *
1 π  column illustrates that 
whilst rounding-down can benefit monopolists the other two practices 
generally harm them. The reason is that all three practices restrict the 
price/quantity combinations that monopolists can choose from and, to that 
extent, worsen their options. For example, it is no longer open to them to offer 
a price of $4.40 and produce the level that would be demanded if consumers 
perceived the price to be $4.40 since, whichever the practice, consumers 
never “see” a price of $4.40. They can only offer prices ending in 99 and sell 
the quantity demanded given the consumers’ perception of that price. When 
consumers round prices down monopolists can sell more at those particular 
prices than they could before and so may make more profit. In the other two cases they cannot since either the 99-price is correctly perceived or it is 
rounded up. 
 
The column headed  * U shows that each method can benefit or harm 
consumers. This is because each practice forces monopolists to offer 
possibilities not previously offered. For example, given the conditions in case 
#2 under conventional assumptions consumers would never be offered a 
price of $1.99 or $2.99. The different patterns of consumption that these new 
possibilities allow may or may not enable consumers to gain utility.       
 
4. Conclusions   
The 99-cent phenomenon can be plausibly explained as the result of rational 
consumers rounding prices up in order to save calculation time. This practice 
is consistent with consumers making the smallest possible mistakes about 
prices and operating within their budget constraints, with producers 
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